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The right to fair trial encompasses a bundle of other rights, most notably the right to an 
independent and impartial tribunal. The two concepts of independence and impartiality have 
been taken to be one but, in actuality, there are two distinct concepts. The objective of this 
study was to decipher the meaning of the requirement of independence and impartiality of a 
tribunal and analyse the same as is applicable to military courts, before examining the 
compliance of Kenyan courts martial with the requirement.  
This study began by conceptualising the rule of law as the principle underpinning the right to 
fair trial and consequently, the right to an independent and impartial tribunal. An independent 
and impartial judiciary and the rule of law are intrinsically linked - the principal role of an 
independent judiciary is to uphold the rule of law while the key link to fostering and 
establishing the rule of law is ensuring an independent judiciary. 1  
This study further elaborated the terms ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality’ before analyzing the 
constituent elements of each component of the requirement of independence and impartiality. 
Thereafter, this study examined the compliance of the courts martial with the requirement of 
independence and impartiality of a tribunal. It was found that the courts martial lack sufficient 
guarantees for independence and impartiality and therefore cannot be said to be independent 
and impartial. This study concluded by recommending that the KDF Act be amended to secure 
guarantees of independence and impartiality of the courts martial in the law.  
 
                                                
1 Kelly W, ‘An independent judiciary: The core of the rule of law’ presented at the International Centre for 
Criminal Justice Reform and Criminal Justice Policy in Vancouver, Canada, 2002, 2. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
 
1.1 Background of the study  
A constituent of the right to fair trial relates to the character of the tribunal before which a 
defendant is tried.2 International human rights law reflects the fundamental precept of the rule 
of law that trial should be by an independent and impartial tribunal that is established by law 
and is jurisdictionally competent to hear a case.3 The United Nations Human Rights Committee 
in General Comment 32 has stated that the aforementioned requirement applies in the same 
manner to military courts. However, there is dissimilarity over the meaning of independence 
and impartiality, with the two concepts often being taken to be one as opposed to two distinct 
concepts, each with its own meaning. Moreover, the interaction of the Defence Forces with the 
executive arm of government brings into question the independence and impartiality of courts 
martial. The requirement of independence and impartiality is further complicated when military 
courts have jurisdiction to try civilians.  
In order to analyse the full effect of trials in military courts, the study will analyse the meaning 
of independence and impartiality as propounded by General Comment 32, various authors as 
well as international and regional instruments and courts. As it stands, the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and authors such as Louise Doswald-Beck 
have identified a two-pronged standard to judicial independence and impartiality. An analysis 
of the same will identify the threshold of independence and impartiality of a tribunal which 
will be used to determine whether the Kenyan courts martial are indeed independent and 
impartial.  
 
1.2 Statement of the problem  
The right to a fair trial, as guaranteed in various international and regional human rights 
instruments, is a key pillar of any judicial system worldwide. Encased in the right to a fair trial 
is a bundle of other rights, such as the right to a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. 
                                                
2 Marks S and Clapham A, International human rights lexicon, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, 154. 
3 Marks and Clapham, International human rights lexicon, 154. 
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Despite being two concepts, independence and impartiality have been taken to mean one thing 
and varying interpretations of the requirement have been rendered. In addition, many questions 
abound over the independence and impartiality of military courts as they are tribunals 
exercising a judicial function but mainly serving persons under the executive arm of 
government. This dissertation consequently seeks to decipher the meaning of independence 
and impartiality in so far as military courts are concerned and to determine whether or not the 
Kenyan courts martial are indeed independent and impartial.  
 
1.3 Purpose of the study  
To analyse the meaning of impartiality and independence within the context of military courts 
and thereafter to find out whether the Kenyan courts martial meet the threshold of 
independence and impartilaity of a tribunal.  
 
1.4 Hypothesis  
The Kenyan courts martial do not meet the threshold of independence and impartiality of a 
tribunal. 
 
1.5 Research questions 
i. What is the meaning of the terms ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality’? 
ii. Do the above terms apply to courts martial in the same manner as ordinary civil 
courts? 
iii. Do the Kenyan courts martial meet the threshold of independence and impartiality?  
 
1.6 Justification of the study 
While military courts are recognised in the Constitution as part of the courts comprising the 
justice system in Kenya, little is known about how such courts function. Part of the questions 
raised whenever there is mention of the courts martial is whether such courts are independent 
and impartial, given that they seem to operate under the executive arm of government despite 
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being judicial organs. This study thus seeks to determine whether, by their very nature, 
constitution and function, courts martial are independent and impartial tribunals. 
 
1.7 Limitation of the study 
This study does not examine summary disciplinary proceedings but rather constricts itself to 
trials conducted by courts martial.  
 
1.8 Definition of terms 
Military court 
A military court is a court that is responsible for the trial and punishment of an offence against 
military law. This term means the same as, and has been used interchangeably with, military 
tribunal and court martial. 
Independence and impartiality are other key terms in this study. However, they are defined and 
elaborated in Chapter Three.  
 
1.9 Chapter summary  
Chapter 1: Introduction  
This is the introduction of the study. This chapter provides the definition of key words used in 
the dissertation, in addition to generally mapping out the study and outlining its justification.  
 
Chapter 2: The Rule of Law  
This chapter introduces the doctrine of the rule of law as the bedrock on which the legal 
requirements of independence and impartiality of a tribunal are hinged. It further the outlines 
the precepts of the rule of law, a critique of the doctrine and the link between it and the dual 
requirement of independence and impartiality.  
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Chapter 3: Judicial Independence and Impartiality: Meaning and Elements  
Chapter 3 provides the meaning of the terms ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality’ through an 
examination of the legal texts that outline and elaborate the dual requirement. It breaks down 
the two concepts into their constituent elements and establishes the threshold to which the 
independence and impartiality of an ordinary civil tribunal must be weighed against. This 
chapter further examines whether the standard of independence and impartiality as applies to 
ordinary civil courts is also applicable to military courts.  
 
Chapter 4: Compliance of the Courts Martial with the Independence and Impartiality 
Requirement: Analysis, Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter locates the courts martial in the structure of courts in Kenya and outlines the 
general structure of the courts martial. It goes on to apply the test of independence and 




CHAPTER TWO  
 
CONCEPTUALIZING THE RULE OF LAW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
“The greatness of any nation lies in its fidelity to the Constitution…and adherence to the rule 
of law.” 
Maraga CJ, Chief Justice of Kenya 
 
The rule of law is the most important political ideal today yet there is much confusion about 
what it means and how it works.4 Brian Tamanaha writes that disagreement exists about what 
the rule of law means amongst casual users of the phrase, government officials and theorists.5 
Thus, the danger of such rampant uncertainty is that the rule of law may devolve into an empty 
phrase, so lacking in meaning that it can be proclaimed with impunity by malevolent 
governments.6 
Although credit for coining the term ‘rule of law’ is usually given to Professor A.V. Dicey, it 
is widely accepted that he did not invent the idea behind it. 7 Thomas Bingham has traced the 
idea back to Aristotle,8 who quipped that, “…the rule of law is preferable to that of any 
individual”.9 The concept of the rule of law can further be traced back to John Locke who 
acknowledged that “all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, 
ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure; so it ought to be exercised by established and 
                                                
4 Tamanaha B, On the Rule of Law History and Politics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, 1. 
5 Tamanaha B, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 114. 
6 Tamanaha B, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 114. 
7 Bingham T, The Rule of Law, Penguin Books, London, 2011, 3. 
8 Bingham T, The Rule of Law, 3. 
9 Aristotle, Politics Book III, 1286,78.  
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promulgated laws in order that both the people may know their duty and be safe and secure 
within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds.”10 
According to Brunella Casalini, the formalistic conception of the rule of law recognises the 
existence of general rules, the coherent, stable application of law, the non-retroactivity of law, 
and the separation between the organ responsible for the production of legislation and 
administration as an intrinsic value of the legal system.11 The existence of a legal system 
endowed with such characteristics is said to make the actions and behaviours of rulers 
predictable and therefore increasing the freedom of the citizen, freeing him or her from the fear 
and insecurity that come from living under an arbitrary government.12 The role of the rule of 
law, according to the formalistic conception of it put forth by Casalini, is thus purely negative.13 
It minimizes the dangers deriving from the arbitrary exercise of political power.14 
 
2.2 The Diceyan conception of the rule of law 
Dicey gave three meanings to the rule of law.15 Of the first, he wrote that no man is punishable 
or can lawfully be made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law 
established in the ordinary legal manner, before the ordinary courts of the land.16 Lord Bingham 
explained this to mean that if anyone is to be punished, it must be for a proven breach of the 
established law of the land.17 Bingham adds that the said breach must be one established before 
the ordinary courts of the land, not a tribunal of members picked to do the government’s 
bidding and consequently lacking the independence and impartiality which are expected of 
judges.18  
                                                
10 Locke J, Second Treaties of Government, 1821, 47; as quoted in Casalini B, ‘Popular sovereignty, the rule of 
law and the “rule of judges” in the United States’ in Costa P, Zolo D (eds), The rule of law: History, theory and 
criticism Springer, Dordrecht, 2007, 214. 
11 Casalini B, ‘Popular sovereignty, the rule of law and the “rule of judges” in the United States’, 214. 
12 Casalini B, ‘Popular sovereignty, the rule of law and the “rule of judges” in the United States’, 214. 
13 Casalini B, ‘Popular sovereignty, the rule of law and the “rule of judges” in the United States’, 214.  
14 Casalini B, ‘Popular sovereignty, the rule of law and the “rule of judges” in the United States’, 214. 
15 Bingham T, The rule of law, 3.  
16 Dicey A, An introduction to the study of the law of the constitution, 188; as quoted in Bingham, The Rule of 
Law, 3. 
17 Bingham T, The rule of law, 3. 
18 Bingham T, The rule of law, 4. 
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Dicey explained the second meaning of the rule of law as being that every man, whatever his 
rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction 
of the ordinary courts.19 The principle of the rule of law demands more than the mere equality 
of all before the law; it imposes the submission of everyone to the same laws administered by 
same courts.20 Dicey thus splits the liberal doctrine of the uniqueness of legal status into two 
principles: that law should be the same for all and so should the jurisdiction.21 Therefore, no 
one is above the law and all are subject to the same law administered in the same courts.22  
The third meaning of rule of law, as deciphered by Dicey, remains largely controversial. Dicey 
explained, “We may say that the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground that 
the general principles of the constitution are with us the result of judicial decisions determining 
the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before courts; whereas [in] many 
foreign constitutions the security (such as it is) given to the rights of individuals results, or 
appears to result, from the general principles of the constitution”.23 Dicey’s explanation has 
been understood to mean that the fundamental rights of the individual are protected by the 
ordinary remedies of the common law provided by the ordinary courts, rather than by a 
Constitution.24 However, this principle is not a general one, but rather a special principle, 
applying specifically to English institutions.25 Consequently, Dicey does not treat this third 
aspect of the rule of law as a principle, unlike the others, and omits to stress its normative 
valence.26 The third aspect of the rule of law is therefore not presented as a principle but as a 
‘formula’ clarifying that the laws are not the source but the consequence of the rights of 
individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts.27 
                                                
19 Dicey A, An introduction to the study of the law of the constitution, 188; as quoted in Bingham, The Rule of 
Law, 4. 
20 Santoro E, ‘The rule of law and the “liberties of the English”: The interpretation of Albert Venn Dicey’ in 
Costa P, Zolo D (eds), The rule of law: History, theory and criticism Springer, Dordrecht, 2007, 164.  
21 Santoro E, ‘The rule of law and the “liberties of the English”: The interpretation of Albert Venn Dicey’, 164.   
22 Bingham T, The rule of law, 4. 
23 Dicey A, An introduction to the study of the law of the constitution, 195; as quoted in Bingham, The Rule of 
Law, 4. 
24 Dicey A, Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution, 10ed, Macmillan, London, 1961, 203.  
25 Beaulac S, ‘The rule of law in international law today’ in Palombella G and Walker N, Relocating the rule of 
law, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009, 199. 
26 Santoro E, ‘The rule of law and the “liberties of the English”: The interpretation of Albert Venn Dicey’, 164.   
27 Dicey A, An introduction to the study of the law of the constitution, 121. 
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The Diceyan conception of the rule of law is not without criticism. Dicey, for one, concentrated 
on the situation and circumstances prevailing in the United Kingdom (UK) at the time of his 
writing.28 For instance, the unique history of running government on the wheels of a largely 
unwritten constitution could have driven the UK to a constitutional scheme whereby ordinary 
courts, rather than the constitution, are at the heart of the rule of law.29 Thus, Dicey’s focus on 
the ordinary courts of the land as the bedrock of the rule of law could not realistically apply, 
for instance, to the developing countries of Africa, where the courts are largely out of reach for 
the poor and ignorant.30 In addition, Dicey’s conception has been criticised for favouring 
judicial legislation that makes the law less, and not more, certain.31 Dicey has also been 
criticised for having a narrow conception of state power with the judicial branch being the 
passive branch of government in the sense that its operation depended primarily on 
mobilisation of the law by private citizens whose mobilisation, in turn, remains largely 
dependent on their power to hire legal services and partly on the executive branch of 
government, especially the police and other security agencies.32 
 
2.3 Hayek’s contribution to the rule of law 
Half a century after Dicey, Hayek pressed a more sophisticated case for the rule of law.33 
According to Hayek, all rule of law systems possess three attributes: generality, equality and 
certainty.34 Generality requires that the law be set out in advance in abstract terms not aimed 
at any particular individual.35 The law thus applies, without exception, to everyone whose 
conduct falls within the prescribed conditions of application,36 effectively considering all 
                                                
28 Ambani J, Mbondenyi M, The new constitutional law of Kenya: Principles, government and human rights, 
Claripress Limited, Nairobi, 2012, 50.  
29 Ojwang J, Constitutional development in Kenya: Institutional adaptation and social change, ACTS Press, 
Nairobi, 1990, 9.  
30 Ojwang J, Constitutional development in Kenya: Institutional adaptation and social change, 9. 
31 Gutto B, ‘The rule of law, democracy and human rights: Whither Africa?’ East African Journal of Peace and 
Human Rights 1 (1996), 130.  
32 Gutto B, ‘The rule of law, democracy and human rights: Whither Africa?’, 130.  
33 Tamanaha B, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 65.  
34 Hayek F, The political idea of the rule of law, National Bank of Egypt Printing Press, Cairo, 1955, 34. 
35 Tamanaha B, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 66.  
36 Tamanaha B, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 66. 
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subjects collectively and all actions in the abstract and not any individual nor any specific 
action.37 Hayek notes that the separation of powers between the legislature and judiciary is 
virtually mandated by the attribute of generality for it is only through such that the law can be 
set out in abstract terms in advance of its application to any particular individual.38 Therefore, 
legislative and judicial separation is an integral part of the rule of law.39 Equality requires that 
the laws apply to everyone without making arbitrary distinctions among people.40 Where 
distinctions exist, they must be approved by a majority of the people inside as well as outside 
the group targeted for differential treatment in order to be legitimate.41 Certainty, on the other 
hand, requires that those who are subject to the law be able to predict reliably what rules will 
be interpreted and applied.42  
 
2.4 Precepts of the rule of law 
Bingham advances eight precepts of the rule of law. However, the precept upon which this 
dissertation is hinged upon is the seventh precept, which provides that adjudicative procedures 
provided by the state should be fair.43 He goes on to explain that the right to a fair trial is a 
cardinal requirement of the rule of law.44 The right to fair trial is a right to be enjoyed, obviously 
and pre-eminently, in a criminal trial, but it also extends beyond a criminal trial.45 Fairness 
means fairness to both sides, not just one.46 Consequently, the procedure followed in a given 
trial must give a fair opportunity for the prosecutor or claimant to prove their case, as also to 
the defendant to rebut it.47 A trial is not fair if the procedural dice are loaded in favour of one 
side or the other; that is, if there is no equality of arms.48 Bingham further notes that fairness is 
                                                
37 Rousseau J, On the social contract, 1762, 212-217. 
38 Hayek F, The constitution of liberty, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1960, 210 – 212.  
39 Hayek F, The constitution of liberty, 210 - 212. 
40 Tamanaha B, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 66.  
41 Hayek F, The constitution of liberty, 207 - 208. 
42 Tamanaha B, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 66.  
43 Bingham T, The Rule of Law, 90.  
44 Bingham T, The Rule of Law, 90.  
45 Bingham T, The Rule of Law, 90.  
46 Bingham T, The Rule of Law, 90.  
47 Bingham T, The Rule of Law, 90.  
48 Bingham T, The Rule of Law, 90. 
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a constantly evolving concept.49 Therefore, a time is unlikely to come when anyone will ever 
be able to say that perfect fairness has been achieved once and for all, and in retrospect, most 
legal systems operating today will be judged to be defective in respects not yet recognised.50  
 
2.5 Judicial independence and impartiality as tenets of the rule of law  
Essential to the rule of law in any land is an independent judiciary - judges not under the thumb 
of other branches of government, and therefore equipped to administer the law impartially.51 
The division of the government into separate compartments, with the application of law 
entrusted to an independent judiciary, promotes liberty by preventing the accumulation of total 
power in any single institution.52 Montesquieu argues that were judicial power joined with the 
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be subject to arbitrary control as the judge 
would be the legislator.53 On the other hand, were judicial power joined to executive power, 
the judge might behave with violence and oppression.54 Allocating the application of law to an 
independent judiciary ensures that a consummately legal institution is available to check the 
legality of governmental action.55 However, judicial independence can be shattered if the 
society law exists to serve does not take care to assure its preservation.56 Bingham explains 
that the guarantee of the independence of judicial decision-makers is essential to their 
integrity.57 Further, Bruce Fein and Burt Neuborne, two US legal scholars, in a co-authored 
essay quipped that judicial independence strengthens ordered liberty, domestic tranquillity, the 
                                                
49 Bingham T, The Rule of Law, 90.  
50 Bingham T, The Rule of Law, 91.  
51 Ginsburg R, Hartnett M, Williams W, My Own Words, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2016, 215.  
52 Tamanaha B, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 35.  
53 Pangle T, Montesquieu’s philosophy of liberalism: A commentary on the spirit of the laws, Chicago 
University Press, Chicago, 1989,162.  
54 Pangle T, Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on the Spirit of the Laws, 162. 
55 Tamanaha B, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 35.  
56 Ginsburg et al, My Own Words, 215. 
57 Bingham T, The Rule of Law, 91.  
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rule of law and democratic ideals. 58 It would thus be folly to squander this priceless 
constitutional gift to placate the clamours of benighted partisan politics.59  
The principle of judicial independence calls for decision-makers to be independent of local 
government, vested interests of any kind, public and parliamentary opinion, the media, political 
parties and pressure groups as well as their own colleagues, particularly those senior to them.60 
Thus, the central idea behind an independent judiciary is not so much to ensure judicial 
rectitude and public confidence, as to prevent the executive and its many agents from imposing 
their powers, interests and persecutive inclinations upon the judiciary.61 Decision-makers must 
therefore be independent of anybody or anything which might lead them to decide issues 
coming before them on anything other than the legal and factual merits of the case as, in the 
exercise of their own judgment, they consider them to be.62  
Closely allied to the requirement of independence is the requirement that a decision-maker be 
impartial.63 This means that the decision-maker, to the greatest extent possible, should 
approach the issues at hand with an open mind, ready to respond to the legal and factual merits 
of the case.64 A decision-maker who is truly independent of all influences extraneous to the 
case to be decided is likely to be impartial, but may nonetheless be subject to personal 
predilections or prejudices which may pervert his or her judgment.65 As judges and other 
decision-makers are human beings, they are inevitably, to some extent, the product of their 
own upbringing, experience and background.66 Thus, the mind which they bring to the decision 
of issues cannot be a blank canvas.67 Only the professional ability of judges, whose thought 
remains closed like a monologue within the courts is relied upon for the rational reconstruction 
                                                
58 Fein B, Neuborne B ‘Why should we care about independent and accountable judges?’ 84 Journal of the 
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of the law.68 In applying the law, the judge must act according to criteria of impartiality and 
neutrality, without engaging in judgments tied to some subjective conception of justice.69 When 
the judge goes beyond the strict application of the norm, he transforms the rule of law into the 
‘rule of men’, allocating himself an arbitrary power.70  However, judges should seek to alert 
themselves to, and so neutralise, any extraneous considerations which might bias their 
judgement, and if they are conscious of bias, or of matters which might give rise to an 
appearance of bias, they must decline to make the decision in question.71 
 
2.6 Military justice and the rule of law 
A military justice system could be judged to be either fair trial compliant or non-fair trial 
compliant. Without any doubt, a non-fair trial compliant military justice system undermines 
the rule of law in many ways.72 Ronald Naluwairo writes that such a justice system can lead to 
the encroachment and usurpation of the jurisdiction of ordinary courts.73  Further, a fair trial 
non-compliant military justice system can result in military tribunals disrespecting, defying 
and circumventing decisions of ordinary courts which amounts to gross violation of the rule of 
law.74 It is a cardinal requirement for ensuring the rule of law that all organs and agencies of 
the state including the army and military tribunals strictly abide by the judgments and orders 
of the judiciary, even when they do not agree with them.75 Moreover, a fair trial non-compliant 
military justice system can have serious implications for the protection, respect and enjoyment 
                                                
68 Habermas J, Between facts and norms: Contribution to a discourse theory of law and democracy, The MIT 
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of individual human rights and fundamental freedoms.76 Naluwairo emphasises that the rule of 
law is a dynamic concept that is essentially concerned with, and entails, the protection and 
respect of fundamental human rights and freedoms.77 Thus, the fact of non-compliance with 
the right to a fair trial is in itself a violation of the fundamental human rights considered key in 
administering justice in a democratic society.78 In addition, a fair trial non-compliant military 
justice system can also be easily manipulated to violate and abuse all other human rights and 
freedoms.79 On the other hand, Naluwairo submits that a fair trial compliant military justice 
system (that is, a system with competent, independent and impartial tribunals) would have 
adequate checks and balances to prevent and ensure that military tribunals do not deliberately 
exceed their mandates by encroaching on the jurisdiction of ordinary courts.80 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
The function of any judicial system is to uphold the rule of law.81 To be able to do that, the 
system must have power to try and decide cases brought before the courts according to the 
established law.82 
The rule of law serves numerous ends.83 The nature of judicial decisions, as a result of the rule 
of law, becomes subjected to the law and is legitimised exclusively by such subjection.84 The 
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rule of law also grounds the whole combination of guarantees – from legal certainty to equality 
before the law and freedom against arbitrariness, from the independence and impartiality of 
judges to the burden of proof being on the prosecutor, and to the rights of the defendant.85 
Therefore, the rule of law is a concept that should be employed to safeguard and advance the 
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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY: MEANING AND ELEMENTS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter sought to elaborate the meaning of the principle of the rule of law and in 
doing so set out an important precept of the rule of law – fair adjudicative processes. At the 
heart of fair adjudicative processes is independent and impartial tribunals. Consequently, the 
existence of independent and impartial tribunals is at the heart of a state that prides itself in 
adhering to the rule of law. As Brian Dickson, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Canada once explained:87  
The tradition of law which we share is a living thing, built by lawyers and judges imbued 
with a love of individual freedom and a dedication to justice for all, according to the 
law…it is only where the law is interpreted by an independent judiciary with vision, a 
sense of purpose and profound sensitivity to society’s values that the rule of law is safe. 
 
The principal role of an independent judiciary is to uphold the rule of law and to ensure the 
supremacy of the law.88 Thus, the key link to fostering and establishing the rule of law is 
ensuring an independent judiciary and providing the environment for a fair and equitable legal 
system where an independent judiciary can flourish.89  
As judicial independence is integral to the rule of law, which is a necessary presupposition for 
the protection of individual rights, it follows that judicial independence is integral to the 
assertion of human rights,90 key among them the right to fair hearing. The right to an 
independent and impartial tribunal is an essential tenet of a fair adjudicative process. As part 
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of the bundle of rights that constitute the right to fair hearing, Article 50 of the Constitution 
requires that a dispute be resolved by an independent and impartial tribunal. 
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1948, further recognizes that everyone is entitled, in full equality, to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal in so far as the determination of a criminal charge is 
concerned. This requirement is also enshrined in Article 14 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).91  The United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), 
in elaborating Article 14 of the ICCPR, stated unequivocally that the right to be tried by an 
independent and impartial tribunal is an absolute right that may suffer no exception.92 Although 
the ICCPR provides for the right to an independent and impartial tribunal, it does not elaborate 
upon the content, nature and scope of this right.93 However, what is clear is that, as the HRC 
has emphasised, it cannot be left to the sole discretion of domestic law to determine the 
essential content of the guarantees contained in the right to a fair trial, which includes the right 
to an independent and impartial tribunal.94  
Glancing at the regional legal framework, Article 7 (1) of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) guarantees the right to have one’s cause heard, a right which 
encompasses the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal. 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Commission Rights has to wit asserted that 
Article 7 should be considered non-derogable as it provides minimum protection to citizens.95  
Despite consensus on the non-derogable and illimitable status of the above provisions, there is 
dissimilarity over the meaning of judicial independence and impartiality. This chapter thus 
                                                
91 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (ratified by Kenya in 
1972).  
92 M Gonzalez del Rio v Peru CCPR Comm. No. 263/1987 (28 October 1992) ¶ 5.2.  
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23 August 2007, 1.  
95 Civil Liberties Organisation, Legal Defence Centre, Legal Defence and Assistance Project v Nigeria, 
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seeks to provide the meaning of independence and impartiality of a tribunal, detailing the 
elements of each, and to analyse the application of the same to military tribunals.  
 
3.2 Judicial Independence 
The right to an independent tribunal is perhaps the most important guarantee in ensuring a fair 
trial and possibly the most important canon in the administration of justice in any democratic 
society.96 It is a major prerequisite for access to justice without which justice remains illusory.97 
Only an independent tribunal is able to render justice impartially on the basis of law.98 In 
addition, the right to an independent tribunal is critical in the realisation of the rule of law. The 
right is further indispensable in the protection of other human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.99 Consequently, the right to an independent tribunal occupies a central place in 
international human rights law; its centrality being reflected in the fact that, along with the right 
to a competent and impartial tribunal, it is an absolute right, meaning that it is not subject to 
any exceptions.100 
An independent judiciary is the cornerstone of democracy.101 The principle of the 
independence of the judiciary is underpinned by several international instruments.102 However, 
the protection of the right to an independent tribunal in treaties is not so much for the benefit 
of the persons who exercise judicial power but rather to ensure that the persons who hold 
judicial office uphold the rule of law and the rights and freedoms of accused persons without 
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fear and interference.103 The Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the Three 
Branches of Government similarly emphasise that an independent and impartial tribunal, and 
by extension an honest and competent judiciary, is integral to upholding the rule of law, 
engendering public confidence and dispensing justice.104  
Judicial independence is an important principle that has classically been taken to mean that 
judges should be free from executive interference.105 However, in modern times, the concept 
has correctly been understood to require judges to be free from outside pressure, 
notwithstanding its source.106  Thus, the definition of judicial independence can no longer be 
restricted to the prohibition of state interference with the judiciary as non-state actors such as 
the media and multinational corporations could also pose a threat to judicial independence.107  
The requirement of independence refers, in particular, to: the procedure and qualifications for 
the appointment of judges; guarantees relating to their security of tenure until a mandatory 
retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exist; the conditions governing 
promotion, transfer, suspension and cessation of their functions; and the actual independence 
of the judiciary from political interference by the executive branch and legislature.108 
Therefore, independence refers to the individual judges (individual independence) and the 
judiciary as a whole (institutional independence).109 
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The rationale behind the principle of judicial independence is to protect individuals against 
abuses of power.110 The independence of the judge is indispensable to impartial justice under 
the law.111 International law consequently imposes a positive obligation on States to take 
specific measures guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, protecting judges from any 
form of political influence in their decision-making.112 This obligation has been echoed by the 
United Nations, which requires the State to guarantee independence of the judiciary.113 Article 
26 of the Banjul Charter places an obligation on States to guarantee the independence of courts. 
In interpreting this provision, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights has 
stated the establishment of a court, by a State, that is controlled by the executive would 
constitute a breach of the Article 26 obligation.114 The Commission has further called on 
African countries to repeal all legislation that is inconsistent with principles of judicial 
independence, to refrain from taking actions that could threaten the independence and security 
of judges as well as magistrates, and to incorporate universal principles of judicial 
independence in their legal systems.115 The Basic Principles of the Independence of the 
Judiciary further calls on States to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary through national 
law. Thus, the constitution, laws and policies of a country must ensure that the system is truly 
independent from other branches of the State.116 Entities within a State, whether governmental 
or not, also have a duty to a respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.117 Judges 
themselves, in the Universal Charter of the Judge, have stated that all institutions and 
authorities, whether national or international, must respect, protect and defend the 
independence of the judiciary and its officials.118  
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The value of judicial independence is not limited to the protection of the citizen from power-
abuse, it also feeds into the general quality of governance and of the interplays of the different 
organs of government.119 This principle has found expression in the Bangalore Principles of 
Judicial Conduct, which were adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial 
Integrity and noted by the UN Commission on Human Rights, as:  
A judiciary of undisputed integrity is the bedrock institution for ensuring compliance 
with democracy and the rule of law. Even when all other protections fail, it provides a 
bulwark against any encroachments on rights and freedoms under the law.120 
 
In addition, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead further stated that if laws are to be interpreted and 
impartially applied, it is important that the judiciary should enjoy an independent status and be 
free from the political pressures engendered by association with either the executive or even 
the legislature itself.121 
Judicial independence can be broadly categorized into institutional and individual (decisional) 
independence. These two categories and their elements will be discussed below. 
 
3.2.1 Institutional Independence 
The notion of institutional independence means that the judiciary ought to be independent of 
the other branches of government.122 Other branches of government have a correlative duty to 
respect and abide by the judgments and decisions of the judiciary.123 Further, institutional 
independence requires that the judiciary have exclusive jurisdiction over all issues of judicial 
nature as well as the requisite authority to decide whether an issue before it is of judicial 
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nature.124 As a corollary, judicial decisions cannot be changed by a non-judicial authority, 
except for cases of mitigation or commutation of sentences and persons.125 Writing particularly 
on the judiciary and the legislature, Judge Cristi Danilet notes that institutional independence 
constitutes a safeguard against disagreements over rulings by other institutions and their 
potential refusal to comply with them.126 Such independence is essential for upholding the rule 
of law and human rights.127  
 
Elements of institutional independence 
An empowered judiciary is one that is independent from any form of interference from either 
state or non-state actors.128 However, complete independence, especially from government, 
would be extremely difficult because the operation of the judiciary is a government 
responsibility, hence the reason it is considered to be one of the three arms.129 Nonetheless, 
there are certain elements which, if present, would give a strong indication that the judiciary is 
independent.130 These are:  
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i. Mode of appointing judges  
In many countries, problems with judicial independence begin with the appointment of 
judges.131 Frequently, the process is politicized or dominated by the executive, a majority party 
in the legislature, or the judicial hierarchy.132 However, judicial appointments should be made 
on the basis of clearly defined criteria and by a publicly declared process.133 Such a process 
should ensure, among other things: equality of opportunity for all who are eligible for judicial 
office; appointment on merit; and that appropriate consideration is given to the need for the 
progressive attainment of gender equity and the removal of other historic factors of 
discrimination.134 Influence by the executive branch over appointments, promotions or transfer 
policy is incompatible with the principle of judicial independence.135 
 
ii. Security of tenure  
Security of tenure means that a judge cannot be removed from his or her position during a term 
of office, except for good cause.136 The Measures for the Effective Implementation of the 
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (The Implementation Measures) stipulate that a judge 
should have a constitutionally guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry 
of a fixed term of office.137 The Implementation Measures further place a duty on the state to 
provide a full complement of judges to discharge the work of the judiciary.138 The UN Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provide that the term of office of judges, 
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conditions of service and retirement age shall be adequately secured by law.139 Principle 18 
further stipulates that judges shall be subject to removal or suspension only for reasons of 
incapacity or behavior that renders them unfit to discharge their duties.140 The International 
Bar Association’s Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence adds criminal acts and 
physical as well as mental incapacity to the grounds for dismissal of a judge.141  
It is universally accepted that when judges can be easily or arbitrarily removed from office, 
they are much more vulnerable to internal or external pressures in consideration of cases.142 
Security of tenure therefore means that only in exceptional circumstances that are prescribed 
by law may a judge be removed from office.143 However, a law that confers powers on the head 
of state to appoint and remove judges threatens the security of tenure of judges and greatly 
undermines the independence of the judiciary.144 
 
iii. Financial security/independence 
A judge may compromise justice for fear of reduction of their salary.145 On the other hand, the 
judiciary may not be able to pursue justice effectively if its finances are controlled by another 
entity.146 Consequently, arrangements for the protection of remuneration must be in place and 
adequate resources should be provided for the judicial system to operate effectively without 
undue constraints which may hamper the independence sought.147 The salaries and pensions of 
judges should be adequate, commensurate with status, dignity and responsibilities of their 
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office and should not be altered to their disadvantage after their appointment.148 In addition, 
the budget of the judiciary should be established in collaboration with the judiciary, care being 
taken that neither the executive nor the legislative is able to exert any pressure or influence on 
the judiciary while setting its budget.149  
 
iv. Structure of government  
The structural relationship between the judiciary and the rest of the government inevitably 
makes judges more or less vulnerable to interference.150 There are two common architectural 
models that either undermine or enhance judicial independence.151 One the one hand is a 
judiciary which is dependent on an executive department, usually the Ministry of Justice, for 
administrative and budgetary functions; while on the other is a judiciary which is separate 
branch of government and has the same degree of self-government and budgetary control over 
its operations as the executive branch has over its operations.152 The former system establishes 
a dependent judiciary while the latter is likely to install judicial independence and autonomy.153 
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct stipulate that a judge must not only be free from 
inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of 
government, but must also appear to a reasonable observer to be free therefrom.154 The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held that the doctrine of separation of powers 
requires that the three pillars of government to exercise power independently; thus, the 
judiciary must be seen to be independent from the executive and parliament.155 The 
Commission has further found that a situation where the functions and competencies of the 
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judiciary and the executive are not clearly distinguishable or where the latter is able to control 
or direct the former is incompatible with the notion of an independent tribunal.156 
 
 
3.2.2 Individual (Decisional) Independence  
While it constitutes a vital safeguard, institutional independence is not sufficient for the right 
to a fair trial.157 Unless individual judges are free from unwarranted interferences when they 
decide a particular case, the individual right to receive a fair trial is violated.158 Individual 
independence denotes that judges have both a right and a duty to decide cases before them 
according to the law, free from fear of reprisals of any kind.159 Put in other words, judges 
should be able to decide cases solely based on the law and facts, without letting the media, 
politics or other concerns sway their decisions, and without fearing penalty in their careers and 
decisions.160  
In safeguarding decisional independence, the Draft Universal Declaration on the Independence 
of Justice (the Singhvi Declaration) provides that in the decision-making process, judges shall 
be independent vis-à-vis their judicial colleagues and superiors.161 Consequently, any 
hierarchical organisation of the judiciary and any difference in grade or rank shall in no way 
interfere with the right of the judge to pronounce his judgment freely.162 Understandably, if 
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judges were to be sued as a result of their judgement then they would be over-cautious and fear 
the consequences of their actions thus hindering the effective dispensation of justice.163  
Lord Denning aptly captured the rationale behind decisional independence in Sirros v Moore 
by stating:164 
Every judge of the courts of this land from the highest to the lowest should be protected 
to the same degree, and liable to the same degree. If the reason underlying this immunity 
is to ensure “that they may be free in thought and independent in judgment”, it applies 
to every judge, whatsoever his rank. Each should be protected from his liability to 
damages when he is acting judicially. Each should be able to do his work in complete 
independence and free from fear. He should not have to turn the pages of his books with 
trembling fingers, asking himself, “If I do this will I be liable in damages?” So long as 
he does his work in the honest belief that it is within his jurisdiction, then he is not liable 
to an action.165 
 
The decisional independence of judges is guaranteed under Article 160 (5) of the Constitution, 
which provides that a member of the Judiciary is not liable in an action or suit in respect of 
anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the lawful performance of a judicial 
function. The question as to whether a judicial officer can be sued in personal capacity for an 
act or omission in the lawful performance of a judicial function was addressed166 in Moses 
Wamalwa Mukamari v John O. Makali & 3 Others.167 Gikonyo J opined:  
The protection offered to judicial officers in Article 160 (5) of the Constitution is 
inherent in the independence of the judiciary as a state organ within the doctrine of 
separation of powers. The protection encapsulates protection from being sued in a 
personal capacity in a cause of action based on an act or omission emanating from the 
lawful performance of a judicial function. I am convinced this is intended to make the 
cover against personal liability complete, especially to prevent the essential substance 
of the protection from oozing out. If it were to be the contrary, that kind of interpretation 
will result into an absurdity because allowing the officer to be sued and appear in his 
personal capacity in a suit based on what he did in the lawful performance of a judicial 
function will already have blown away the very constitutional cover for the officer’s 
fallibility provided under Article 160 (5) of the Constitution. 
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Justice Gikonyo went on to outline that Article 160 (5) is not a means to avoid public scrutiny 
and answerability of the judicial officers but it is rather aimed at enhancing judicious actions 
free from extraneous factors such as fear, favour or subservience.168 
 
3.3 Judicial Impartiality  
The right to a fair trial requires judges to be impartial.169 The right to be tried by an impartial 
tribunal implies that judges (or jurors) have no interest or stake in a particular case and do not 
hold pre-formed opinions about it or the parties.170 Thus, cases must only be decided “on the 
basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restriction”.171 To this end, the State, 
other institutions and private parties have an obligation to refrain from putting pressure on or 
inducing judges to rule in a certain way and judges have a correlative duty to conduct 
themselves impartially.172  
The UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary spell out this requirement by 
the words “judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity 
of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary”.173 The Council of 
Europe has reiterated this principle, by asserting that judges should have unfettered freedom to 
decide cases impartially, in accordance with their conscience and their interpretation of the 
facts, and in pursuance of the prevailing rules of the law.174 For its part, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has noted that an impartial tribunal is one of the core elements 
of the minimum guarantees in the administration of justice.175 Further, the Human Rights 
                                                
168 Franceschi L and Lumumba P, The constitution of Kenya, 2010: An introductory commentary, 481.  
169 International Commission of Jurists, International principles on the independence and accountability of 
judges, lawyers and prosecutors: Practitioner’s guide No. 1, 27. 
170 International Commission of Jurists, International principles on the independence and accountability of 
judges, lawyers and prosecutors: Practitioner’s guide No. 1, 27. 
171 Principle 2, UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. 
172 International Commission of Jurists, International principles on the independence and accountability of 
judges, lawyers and prosecutors: Practitioner’s guide No. 1, 27. 
173 Principle 8, UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. 
174	Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (94) principle I.2.d.	
175 Guy Malari v Haiti, IACmHR Case No. 12.355 (2002), para. 74.  
 28 
Committee, has explained that impartiality of the court implies that judges must not harbour 
preconceptions about the matter put before them, and that they must not act in ways that 
promote the interests of one of the parties.176 The Committee has also pointed out that the right 
to an impartial tribunal is closely bound up with the procedural guarantees conferred on the 
defence.177 
The requirement of impartiality has two aspects.178 First, judges must not allow their judgement 
to be influenced by personal bias or prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular 
case before them, nor act in ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the parties to 
the detriment of the other (actual or subjective impartiality).179 Second, the tribunal must also 
appear to a reasonable observer to be impartial (apparent or objective impartiality).180 These 
two aspects will be further discussed below: 
3.3.1 Actual and apparent impartiality (subjective and objective impartiality) 
The impartiality of a court can be defined as the absence of bias, animosity or sympathy 
towards either of the parties.181 However, there are cases in which this bias will not be manifest 
but only apparent.182 That is the reason why the impartiality of courts must be examined from 
a subjective as well as an objective perspective.183  
The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa 
contain detailed criteria to determine the impartiality of a tribunal and specific cases in which 
impartiality would be undermined. The Principles outline that impartiality could be determined 
on the basis of three factors: whether the position of the judicial officer allows him or her to 
play a crucial role in the proceedings; whether the judicial officer may have expressed an 
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opinion which would influence the decision-making; and whether the judicial officer would 
have to rule on an action taken in a prior capacity.184 Consequently, the impartiality of a judicial 
body would be undermined, among other instances, when: a former public prosecutor or legal 
representative sits as a judicial officer in a case in which he or she prosecuted or represented a 
party; a judicial officer secretly participated in the investigation of a case; and a judicial officer 
has some connection with the case or a party to the case.185 If any of these circumstances 
present themselves, a judicial officer is under an obligation to step down.186 
The European Court of Human Rights makes a distinction between endeavouring to ascertain 
the personal conviction of a given judge in a given case, and determining whether the judge 
offered guarantees sufficient enough to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.187 The first 
of these concepts is called subjective impartiality while the latter is referred to as objective 
impartiality.188 Thus, trial will be unfair not only if the judge is not impartial but also if he or 
she is not perceived to be impartial. 189  
The European Court of Human Rights has a long line of jurisprudence in which these two 
requirements of impartiality are defined.190 According to the Court, a judge or tribunal will 
only be impartial if it passes the subjective and objective tests.191 The subjective test “consists 
in seeking to determine the personal conviction of a particular judge in a given case”.192 This 
entails that “no member of the tribunal should hold any personal prejudice or bias.”193 Personal 
impartiality is presumed unless there is evidence to the contrary.194 Determining objective 
impartiality, on the other hand, requires ascertaining whether the tribunal itself and, among 
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other aspects, its composition, offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in 
respect of impartiality.195 It must thus be determined whether, apart from the judge’s conduct, 
there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to his or her impartiality.196 The 
objective test mainly concerns hierarchical or other links between the judge and other 
protagonists in the proceedings or the exercise of different functions within the judicial process 
by the same person.197 It must therefore be decided in each individual case whether the 
relationship in question is of such a nature and degree as to indicate a lack of impartiality on 
the part of the tribunal.198 Under the Court’s jurisprudence, if either test fails, a trial will be 
deemed unfair.199  
The concept of impartiality creates a correlative duty for judges to step down from cases in 
which they think they will not be able to impart justice impartially or when their actual 
impartiality may be compromised.200 In these cases, they should not expect the parties to a case 
to challenge their impartiality but should excuse themselves and abstain from sitting in the 
case.201 To this effect, the European Court of Human Rights has established the principle that 
“any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality must 
withdraw”.202 
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct include impartiality as one of the fundamental 
values inherent in the judicial function. Principle 2.5 provides detailed guidelines as to the 
cases in which judges should disqualify themselves from a case. These include, but are not 
limited to, instances where: 
(i) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;  
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(ii) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in 
controversy; or  
(iii) The judge, or a member of the judge’s family, has an economic interest in the 
outcome of the matter in controversy.  
 
3.4 Applicability of the requirement of independence and impartiality to military courts  
Having clarified in the foregoing part the meaning of judicial independence and impartiality, 
as well as their categories and constituent elements as applicable to civilian courts, this part of 
the dissertation seeks to determine whether the same meaning of independence and impartiality 
can be attributed to military courts.  
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has unequivocally stated that the requirement 
of independence and impartiality applies to all courts and tribunals, whether ordinary or 
specialised, civilian or military.203  The Committee further stated that the dual requirement 
cannot be modified or limited because of the military character of the court concerned.204 
Addressing the military courts of law, the African Commission opined that the critical factor 
in determining the independence and impartiality of a military tribunal was whether the process 
was fair, just and impartial.205 The Commission further stated that military tribunals must be 
subject to the same requirements of fairness, openness and justice, independence and due 
process as any other tribunal.206 Thus, what would cause offence is failure to observe basic or 
fundamental standards that would ensure fairness.207 It is thus clear that in the administration 
of justice, military courts must comply with the requirement of an independent and impartial 
tribunal.208  
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Having established that the requirement of independence and impartiality applies in equal 
measure to military courts, the question that should then be asked concerns the indicia of 
independence and impartiality of military courts.  
 
3.4.1 Indicia of independence  
The Draft Principles Governing the Administration of Justice Through Military Courts (the 
Draft Principles) provides the most authoritative guidelines on the independence of military 
courts. The indicia of independence of such courts, as provided in the Draft Principles, will be 
discussed below:  
 
Mode of appointing personnel  
Principle 13, while not mentioning the process of selection or appointment of judges, 
emphasises that judges called to sit in military courts should be competent, having undergone 
the same legal training as that required of professional judges. The underlying rationale is that 
the legal competence and ethical standards of military judges who are fully aware of their duties 
and responsibilities form an intrinsic part of their independence.209 The African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights has reiterated that the selection of military serving officers with 
little or no knowledge of law as members of a military tribunal runs contrary to the 
independence of the judiciary.210  
 
Security of tenure  
Security of tenure, as has been explained in the preceding part, entails providing judges with 
guaranteed terms in office, dismissing them only upon attainment of a mandatory retirement 
age or on serious grounds of misconduct or incompetence.211  European jurisprudence on 
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security of tenure as applicable to military courts provides that a specified term of office that 
is subject to renewal casts questions on the independence of judges.212 
 
Financial security/independence  
The essence of financial security as a condition for securing independence of a tribunal is that 
the right to salary and pension should be established by law and not be subject to arbitrary 
interference by the executive in a manner that could affect judicial independence.213 Applying 
this to military courts means that the salaries, allowances and other remunerations and benefits 
of military judges must not depend on the grace or favour of the executive nor on the military 
hierarchy.214 The Supreme Court of Canada found that a prohibition on pegging an officer’s 
performance as a member of a military court or as a military trial judge from being used to 
determine his qualifications for rate of pay was a sufficient guarantee of financial security.215  
 
Structure of government  
The Draft Principles assert that the establishment of military tribunals must respect the 
principle of separation of powers.216 The Draft Principles elaborate that the principle of 
separation of powers goes hand in hand with the requirement of statutory guarantees of 
avoiding any interference by the executive or military in the administration of justice.217 They 
further place a duty on all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the 
independence of military courts.218 
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3.4.2 Indicia of impartiality  
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights recognised that the composition of a 
tribunal may create an appearance of lack of impartiality.219 Thus, a tribunal must appear to 
reasonable observers to be impartial, in line with the maxim ‘justice must not only be done, but 
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.’220 Impartiality when it comes to 
military courts is a rather complex matter.221 Parties to a trial in a military court have good 
reason to view the military judge as an officer who is capable of being “a judge in his own 
cause” in any case involving the armed forces as an institution.222 However, the presence of a 
civilian judge in the composition of military courts serves to meet the requisite threshold of 
impartiality.223  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter sought to clarify the meaning of independence and impartiality of a tribunal. 
While independence and impartiality are closely linked, the two concepts have distinct 
meanings.224 In general terms, independence refers to the autonomy of a given judge or tribunal 
to decide cases by applying the law to the facts.225 Impartiality, on the other hand, denotes the 
state of mind of a judge or a tribunal towards a case and the parties to it.226   
 
This chapter further listed and elaborated the categories of independence and impartiality, those 
of the former being institutional and decisional independence while those of the latter being 
actual and apparent (subjective and objective) impartiality. It was then established that 
guarantees of one category of independence and impartiality are not sufficient to declare a 
                                                
219 Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Akamu and Others) v Nigeria, ACmHPR Comm. 60/91, 13 
Activity Report, para 14.  
220 Dictum by Lord Hewart in R v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259 as quoted in 
Naluwairo R, ‘Military courts and human rights: A critical analysis of the compliance of Uganda’s military 
justice with the right to an independent and impartial tribunal’, 458.  
221 Principle 13, Draft Principles Governing the Administration of Justice Through Military Courts.	
222 Principle 13, Draft Principles Governing the Administration of Justice Through Military Courts. 
223 Principle 13, Draft Principles Governing the Administration of Justice Through Military Courts.	
224 Dr. Alsheban A, ‘Judicial impartiality and independence of the judiciary (comparative study)’, 39. 
225 Dr. Alsheban A, ‘Judicial impartiality and independence of the judiciary (comparative study)’, 39. 
226 Dr. Alsheban A, ‘Judicial impartiality and independence of the judiciary (comparative study)’, 39. 
 35 
tribunal independent and impartial. A tribunal will only be held to be independent and impartial 
if it satisfies the tests for institutional and decisional independence as well as subjective and 
objective impartiality.  
 
Perhaps the most imperative research question answered in this chapter concerned the 
applicability of the requirement of independence and impartiality to military courts. It was 
established, through an examination of General Comment 32 as well as the Draft Principles 
Governing the Administration of Justice Through Military Courts and case law, that the dual 
requirement of an independent and impartial tribunal applies to military courts in the same 
manner as it does to ordinary civil courts.  
 
The next chapter will consequently seek to determine whether the Kenyan courts martial meet 





CHAPTER FOUR  
 
COMPLIANCE OF THE COURTS MARTIAL WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF 
INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTILAITY: ANALYSIS, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
4.1 Introduction  
The right to an independent and impartial tribunal is an important tenet of the right to a fair 
trial, applying not only to ordinary civil courts but also to military courts and tribunals. The 
previous chapter sought to elaborate the concepts of independence and impartiality as well as 
their applicability to military courts. It was subsequently concluded that the principles of 
independence and impartiality apply in their entirety to military courts. Consequently, a 
military court ought to meet the institutional and decisional elements of independence as well 
as those of objective and subjective impartiality for it to be deemed to be truly independent and 
impartial. This chapter subsequently seeks to analyse the guarantees of independence and 
impartiality of the courts martial in Kenya in order to determine whether the Kenyan courts 
martial have met the threshold of institutional and individual independence as well as objective 
and subjective impartiality. 
 
4.2 The Kenyan Court System  
Any analysis of the courts martial must first begin with tracing their place within the Kenyan 
judicial system. The 2010 Constitution classifies courts into two categories: superior courts 
and subordinate courts.227 Superior courts consist of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, 
the High Court and other courts with the status of the High Court with competence to hear and 
determine disputes relating to employment and labour relations as well as the environment and 
the use and occupation of, and title to, land.228  
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On the other hand, subordinate courts include the Magistrates courts, Kadhis courts, Courts 
Martial as well as any other court or local tribunal as may be stablished by an Act of 
Parliament.229 The jurisdiction, powers and functions of subordinate courts are prescribed by 
legislation.230 Nonetheless, subordinate courts are precluded from engaging in Constitutional 
interpretation, which is solely the mandate of superior courts.231 However, Parliament may 
enact legislation to give original jurisdiction, in appropriate cases, to subordinate courts to hear 
and determine applications for redress of a denial, violation or infringement of, or threat to, a 
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4.3 Structure and Jurisdiction of Courts Martial  
The Constitution leaves room for the operation of courts martial, which are tribunals 
established to try military personnel who commit the offences provided for under the Kenya 
Defence Forces Act of 2012 (KDF Act).233 A court martial consists of a Judge Advocate, who 
is the presiding officer; at least five other members, appointed by the Defence Court-martial 
Administrator, if an officer is being tried; and at not less than three other members in any 
case.234 The KDF Act requires that at least one such member be of equivalent rank as the 
accused person (where the accused person is an officer) and the lowest ranking officer in the 
Defence Forces who is available at the time when the accused person is a service member.235  
In addition, the Act limits the personal jurisdiction of the courts martial to any person subject 
to the Act for any offence under the Act.236 The Act lists a rather broad class of persons who 
are subject to it. This list encompasses: members of the regular forces, members of the reserve 
forces including the auxiliary reserve force, alleged spies of the enemy, persons in civil custody 
suspected of committing service crimes, persons serving or attached to the Defence Forces in 
another country pursuant to a treaty or agreement signed by Kenya, persons accompanying a 
unit of the Defence Forces that is on active service and persons attending a Defence Forces 
Institution.237 The Act also extends its scope to civilians who accompany a unit of the Defence 
Forces that is either outside Kenya or on operations against the enemy, and have consented in 
writing to such accompanying.238  
Similar to its jurisdiction over persons, the courts martial has a wide array of service offences 
over which it exercises jurisdiction over. These offences can be broadly classified into 
categories, which include: treachery, cowardice and offences arising out of service; offences 
relating to the disobedience of orders; insubordination; and offences concerning courts martial 
and other authorities.239 Courts martial have jurisdiction to try civilian offences, provided that 
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they were committed by the aforementioned persons who are subject to the Act.240 In addition, 
courts martial also have sentencing powers for civil offences.241 However, a court martial is 
precluded from exercising its jurisdiction on a civilian, who though subject to the KDF Act, 
has been charged with an offence under the Sexual Offences Act.242  
 
4.4 Analysis of the independence and impartiality of the courts martial  
The evaluation of the independence and impartiality of the courts martial must first begin with 
a distinction between the trial of military personnel and that of civilians,243 given the 
jurisdiction of the courts martial.   
Military personnel are typically tried by a court martial for breaches of military discipline and 
criminal offences.244 The distinction between the two types of offences depends on the nature 
of the prohibited act and the penalty245 attributed to it. The resultant import of such a distinction 
is that disciplinary offences are, more often than not, not protected by fair trial provisions, 
including the right to an independent and impartial tribunal.246 On the other hand, if the offence 
in question is criminal in nature, then the trial of military personnel must conform to fair trial 
requirements.247 
Regarding the trial of civilians, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has asserted that 
the ICCPR, in contemplation of the right to a fair trial, does not prohibit the trial of civilians in 
military courts but requires that such trials be in full conformity with fair trial guarantees.248 
Doswald-Beck gives two reasons behind the reasoning of the Human Rights Committee. First, 
that civilians tried before military courts would not be in the same situation as those before 
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civilian courts, consequently leading to inequality before the courts.249 Secondly, the objective 
impartiality would not be present when a military court has jurisdiction to try a civilian for acts 
against the armed forces.250 The Inter-American Court has been the most straightforward in 
denouncing the use of military tribunals to try civilians,251 citing that when a military court 
takes over jurisdiction over a matter that regular courts should hear, the individual’s right to a 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal and, a fortiori, their right to due 
process have been violated.252 This position has been reiterated by the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, which affirmed that military tribunals should not, in any 
circumstances whatsoever, have jurisdiction over civilians.253 
 
 4.4.1 Institutional independence  
In the context of military justice, institutional independence requires that military tribunals be 
free from interference, especially from the executive and the military hierarchical command 
with respect to matters that relate to their judicial function.254 The following analysis of 
institutional independence takes into consideration the jurisdiction of courts martial to try both 
military personnel and civilians. 
 
Appointment of members of the courts martial  
The Draft Principles Governing the Administration of Justice Through Military Tribunals 
provides that the organisation and operation of military courts should fully ensure the right of 
everyone to a competent, independent and impartial tribunal at every stage of legal 
proceedings, from initial investigation to trial.255 Consequently, the persons selected to perform 
the functions of judges in military courts must display integrity and competence and show 
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proof of the necessary legal training and qualifications.256 In addition, military judges should 
have a status guaranteeing their independence and impartiality, in particular vis-à-vis the 
military hierarchy.257 Moreover, one of the most important prerequisites for ensuring the 
institutional independence of military tribunals is that the authority that appoints members of 
a tribunal must not be the same one that appoints prosecutors.258 
Regarding membership of the courts martial, the Chief Justice bears the duty of appointing the 
Judge Advocate.259 The KDF Act stipulates that the Judge Advocate at each court martial shall 
be a magistrate or an advocate of at least a ten-year standing.260 The criteria for appointment 
of a magistrate is derived from Section 32 of the Judicial Service Act,261 which provides that a 
person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a magistrate unless the person: 
(a) Is an advocate of the High Court of Kenya; 
(b) Has high moral character, integrity and impartiality; 
(c) Has demonstrable management skills; 
(d) Has proficiency in computer applications; and  
(e) Has no pending complaints from the Advocates Commission or the Disciplinary 
Committee. 
The Judicial Service Commission is tasked with the appointment, discipline and removal of 
Magistrates.262 It does so through the constitution of a committee or panel,263 whose conduct 
and procedure is outlined in the Third Schedule of the Judicial Service Act.264 Hence, there are 
clear criteria concerning the appointment of Judge Advocates as well as procedure regarding 
their discipline and removal.  
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Regarding members of the Defence Forces who also constitute the courts martial, the KDF Act 
provides that such members shall be ‘so qualified and not ineligible under Section 164’.265 
Section 164 subsequently bars a convening officer from being part of the court martial which 
they themselves convene. This Section further prohibits a commanding officer and an 
investigating officer from being members of the court martial that tries the particular accused 
person. The KDF Act thus does not outline the criteria for appointment of members of the 
Defence Forces to courts martial, other than their position in the Force. This is an insufficient 
guarantee of independence of such officials, and the courts martial at large, as they are still 
subject to the military hierarchy. 
In a bid to distinguish the functions and operation of the members of a court martial from the 
prosecutorial authority, the KDF Act provides for the independent office of the Director of 
Military Prosecutions.266 The Director is appointed by the Defence Council,267 in keeping with 
the following criteria: The Director should be an officer not below the rank of Lieutenant 
Colonel and should be an advocate of the High Court of Kenya of not less than ten years 
standing.268 The Act further delineates the functions of the Director of Military Prosecutions, 
which include the exercise of prosecutorial powers against persons subject to the Act at a court 
martial for the offences falling under the jurisdiction of the court martial.269 To safeguard the 
independence of this office, the KDF Act provides that the Director of Military Prosecutions 
does not require the consent of any person or authority for prosecutions and the exercise of the 
functions and powers conferred shall not be under the direction or control of any person or 
authority.270 The fact that members of courts martial are distinguished from the prosecutorial 
authority suffices as an adequate safeguard of the institutional independence of courts martial. 
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Security of tenure  
As was established in the previous chapter, security of tenure means tenure - whether until the 
age of retirement, for a fixed term or for a specific adjudicative task - that is secure from 
interference from the executive or other appointing authority in a discretionary manner.271 The 
question of security of tenure is most relevant for Judge Advocates.272 In addition, it is not 
enough that the instruments of appointment of the members of courts martial and the Judge 
Advocate stipulate their tenure - the right to an independent and impartial tribunal requires that 
their tenure as persons who exercise judicial power to be adequately secured by law.273 For 
members of the regular Defence Forces serving in the courts martial, the retirement age is set 
at sixty-four.274 On the other hand, the retirement age of a Judge Advocate, as prescribed by 
the Judicial Service Act, is set at the mandatory retirement age of public officers.275 However, 
a Judge Advocate may also elect to retire at any time upon attaining fifty five years of age.276 
Regarding removal of members of a court martial, the Judicial Service Commission is 
mandated to establish a committee or panel for the purposes of discipline or removal of a Judge 
Advocate.277 The committee or panel is required to follow an established procedure, as has 
been outlined in the Third Schedule of the Judicial Service Act. 
It can thus be concluded that members of the courts martial enjoy security of tenure as military 
officers and the Judge Advocate as a magistrate. However, such a conclusion would be 
incongruent with the requirement that security of tenure must be in respect of judicial office 
and not by virtue of assuming military office.278 The security of tenure of members of courts 
martial as military officers cannot guarantee independence as they remain subject to military 
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Financial security is an important consideration for both Judge Advocates and other members 
of the courts martial. The requirement of financial security as an indicium of independence will 
not be satisfied if the executive is in a position to reward or punish the conduct of members of 
the court martial and the Judge Advocate by the granting or withholding of benefits.280  
The Defence Council is mandated to determine the salaries of members of the Defence 
Forces.281 Such determination is premised on the advice of the Salaries and Remuneration 
Commission.282 The Defence Council is also responsible for the promotion and transfer of 
members of the Defence Forces.283 It is worthwhile to note that the President may remove, 
retire or redeploy the Chief of the Defence Forces and any Service Commander, who make up 
part of the Defence Council, at any time before the expiry of their term of office.284 The KDF 
Act further provides that funds of the Defence Forces consist of money allocated by Parliament; 
money or assets accruing to the Defence Forces; and money from other sources provided for 
or donated to the Defence Forces.285 The National Assembly is tasked with allocation of the 
above-mentioned funds to the Defence Forces.286  
On the other hand, the Constitution provides that the remuneration and benefits payable to 
judges shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund.287 The Constitution further stipulates that 
such remuneration and benefits shall not be varied to the disadvantage of a judge.288 It can thus 
                                                
279 Naluwairo R, ‘Military courts and human rights: A critical analysis of the compliance of Uganda’s military 
justice with the right to an independent and impartial tribunal’, 463. 
280 R v Généreux, para. 58.  
281 Section 29 (2), KDF Act (Act No. 25 of 2012). 
282 Section 29 (2), KDF Act (Act No. 25 of 2012). 
283 Section 28 (2), KDF Act (Act No. 25 of 2012). 
284 Section 26, KDF Act (Act No. 25 of 2012). 
285 Section 285 (1), KDF Act (Act No. 25 of 2012). 
286 Section 286 (1), KDF Act (Act No. 25 of 2012). 
287 Article 160 (3), Constitution of Kenya (2010); see also Section 26 (1), Judicial Services Act (No. 1 of 2011). 
288 Article 160 (4), Constitution of Kenya (2010).  
 45 
be concluded that the remuneration and benefits of the Judge Advocate are secured in law by 
virtue of the Judge Advocate’s qualification as a magistrate. However, there is insufficient 
information to conclude that other members of courts martial enjoy financial security.  
 
4.4.2 Decisional independence  
Military tribunals must not only be self-governing as regards their administrative and 
operational matters, but they must also be independent in their decision-making.289 Their 
decisions, like those of ordinary civil courts, should never be subjected to revision by a non-
judicial establishment.290 The KDF Act guarantees the decisional independence of members of 
the courts martial by stipulating that they shall not be liable for any criminal or civil 
proceedings as well as administrative sanctions for anything done, omitted, reported or said in 
good faith in the exercise or purported exercise of a power or in the performance of a duty or 
function.291 In addition, decisions of the courts martial are only subject to appellate review by 
the High Court and other superior courts on matters concerning the conviction, sentence or 
both.292  
 
4.4.3 Impartiality  
The threshold that a tribunal has to meet in order to be deemed impartial encompasses both 
subjective and objective impartiality, as was explained in the previous chapter. By its very 
nature, the subjective test depends on each particular case.293 Thus, an assessment of the courts 
martial impartiality from a subjective lens will not constitute part of the analysis of their 
impartiality. Suffice it to emphasise that, however subjectively impartial a tribunal is, it cannot 
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comply with the right to an impartial tribunal if, from an objective point of view, it cannot be 
said to be impartial.294 
As members of the military are members of the executive, it will normally be difficult to 
conclude that military tribunals are independent, especially if they are given jurisdiction to try 
civilians accused of serious crimes such as terrorism and treason.295 Nonetheless, the KDF Act 
contains certain guarantees of impartiality of the courts martial. The Act bars a convening 
officer from being a member of a court martial which the officer himself or herself convenes.296 
The Act further bars an accused’s commanding officer and investigating officer(s) from being 
members of the court martial which tries the accused.297  
Regarding the trial of civilians, the Human Rights Committee has noted that such trial should 
be exceptional, being permitted only where a State Party (to the ICCPR) can show that resorting 
to such trials is necessary and justified by objective and serious reasons and where – with regard 
to the specific class of individuals and offences at issue – the regular civilian courts are unable 
to undertake the trials.298 The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights has 
reiterated this, adding that very often, military tribunals are an extension of the executive and 
are consequently not intended to try civilians.299 Nonetheless, military tribunals are not negated 
by the mere fact of being presided over by military officials; the critical factor is whether the 
process was just, fair and impartial.300  
The KDF Act limits the jurisdiction of courts martial over civilians to only those who 
accompanying the Defence Forces and have expressed consent to be tried by a court martial. 
In addition, recognising the primacy of civil courts, courts martial have no jurisdiction over 
civilian offences.301 The presence of a Judge Advocates and their role introduces a semblance 
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of impartiality in the trial of civilians by courts martial.  Judge Advocates only serve to give 
directions and rulings on questions of law, procedure or practice and any resultant ruling or 
direction shall be binding on the court martial.302 The Court of Appeal has reiterated the role 
of the Judge Advocate, emphasising that it is a heavy one which is meant to ensure that trials 
in the court martial meet the standards of fairness of a trial, underscored by impartiality.303  
The requirement of impartiality is premised on the principle of administration of justice that 
requires that justice must not only be done, but must be manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to 
be done.304 Reiterating the position of the African Commission that the composition of a 
tribunal can create the appearance of lack of impartiality.305 This study arrives  at the 
conclusion that the composition of courts martial, particularly where civilian offenders are 
concerned, creates the appearance of impartiality. However, this impartiality could be 
threatened as a result of insufficient guarantees of independence, as was noted by Ronald 
Naluwairo. 
 
4.5 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Conclusion 
The right to an independent and impartial tribunal constitutes one of the most important 
guarantees for ensuring a fair trial in a democratic society.306 Through the various objective 
standards it sets, it ensures that justice is not only done, but is also manifestly seen to be done.307 
However, this is not the case for Kenyan courts martial. These military courts have not met the 
standards for ensuring an independent and impartial tribunal as they do not meet the threshold 
for institutional independence. There are insufficient guarantees pertaining to the appointment 
of members of the courts martial who are also members of the Defence Forces as well as their 
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and security of tenure. Regarding the former, there is no criteria for appointment of members 
of the Defence Forces as judicial officers in courts martial other than their membership of the 
Defence Forces. As a result, such members of the courts martial remain subject to the military 
hierarchy and this has an adverse effect on the institutional independence of courts martial. In 
addition, such members of the courts martial enjoy security of tenure as military officials as 
opposed to judicial officials. This buttresses the conclusion that devoid of such protection, they 
remain dependent on the military chain of command for promotion and other benefits. Similar 
to lack of appointment criteria, the lack of financial security weakens the institutional 
independence of the courts martial as judicial tribunals. Consequently, while there exist 
sufficient guarantees for other standards of independence, such as decisional independence, the 
courts martial cannot be said to be independent and impartial as the structure, function and 
operation of such courts does not meet the collective standards of independence and 
impartiality of a tribunal.  
 
Recommendations 
A primary recommendation is to delve into further research pertaining to military justice in 
Kenya. Aside from that, however, the KDF Act should be amended to include the criteria for 
appointment of members of the Defence Forces as members of courts martial, in addition to 
their rank in the Defence Forces. The Act should further provide a specific tenure for such 
officials as well as the grounds and procedure for their removal. However, it is not enough that 
the Act be amended. While having sufficient guarantees of independence is important, these 
guarantees encased in the law ought to be implemented in order for independence and 
impartiality to be realised. A further recommendation would thus be that there be established 
a task force that will be under the Judicial Service Commission to examine the guarantees of 
independence and impartiality of courts martial as provided by the law and in practice and to 
further recommend measures which can be taken to realise the independence and impartiality 
of such courts. Regarding impartiality, while the presence of a Judge Advocate is meant to act 
as guarantee for the impartiality of a military tribunal, the absence of crucial safeguards of 
independence may weaken the impartiality of military courts. An amendment of the KDF Act 
to reflect the above recommendations on institutional independence would greatly bolster the 
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